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In the Supi-eme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RoYAL CAx.xrxG CoRPORATION a 
. ' 
corporation, and CoNTINENTAL 
CA~l~~-\.LTY Col\IPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Plaintiffs, 
YS. 
IsnrsTRL-\.L Col\1:\IISSION OF UTAH· 
and DoROTHY :NIARIE HuGHES, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
No. 6383 
This is an original proceeding in this court for the 
purpose of reviewing the award made by the Industrial 
Commission .of the State of Utah against these plaintiffs 
and in favor of the defendant Dorothy Marie Hughes, 
granting her compensation and ordering these plaintiffs 
to pay said compensation; and the findings and conclu-
sions of the C·ommission upon which said award is pred-
icated, dated April 9, 1941, in the matter designated by 
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the Commission as Claim No. 4345. After petition for 
rehearing had been filed within the time prescribed by 
law by the plaintiffs herein and after the same had been 
denied, plaintiffs herein, within due time, applied to 
this co_urt for the issuance of writ of certiorari, which 
'vas issued by this court and to which return has been 
made to this court. 
The case involves the question of whether or not 
Dorothy Marie Hughes is entitled to the amount of com-
pensation awarded her by the Industrial Commission. 
It is the contenti~on of the plaintiffs that Dorothy Marie 
Hughes is not entitled to double compensation, nor to 
compensation in the amount awarded her by the Com-
IDlSSion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The hearings in this matter occurred on three dif-
ferent dates, October 23, 1940 at Ogden, January 29, 
1941 at Salt Lake City, and on ¥arch 18, 1941 at Salt 
Lake City. The reports of the hearings are numbered 
12, 25, and 30 in the certificate of the Industrial Com-
n1ission to this court, and for the purpose of convenience 
and to avoid confusi~on we will refer to N'o. 12 as 1 T., 
No. 25 as 2 T., and No. 30 as 3 T., since the pages of 
the hearings are eached numbered from 1 on consecu-
tively. Where the remainder of the record is referred 
to, it will be referred to by the letter R. 
There is practically no ~dispute in the facts in this 
case. Dorothy Marie Hughe-s, a minor, sixteen and a 
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half yt~ars old, \Ya~ employed by the plaintiff Royal 
Canning Con1pauy at its canning fac.tory in Ogden, Utah, 
July 3~ 1940. She worked eig·ht hours on July 3, three 
and a half hours on July 4, did not work July 5, eight 
hours on July G, ten hours July 7, ten hours July 8, 
and three and a half hours July 9. July 3, the date of 
her employment, can1e on a '''T ednesday. Most of the 
time she \Yas engaged in sorting cherries. On July 9, 
\Yhich \Yas Tuesday, the forewoman put her to work 
sorting cherries on the side ~of the belt where there 
were proper guards and barricades to protect the work-
men from moving machinery. ~fiss Hughes however, 
moved to the other side of the belt, which was un-
guarded. Sometimes the cherries became stuck in the 
chute and \Yhen this occurred, the girls had tn loosen 
them and were provided with a :stick for the purpose, 
which stick was between eighteen and twenty inches 
long. On the day in question the cherries became stuck 
in the chute and ~fiss Hughes, instead of using the stick, 
tried to loosen the cherries with her hand and her dress 
got caught in the shaft and in trying to loosen it, both 
~of her hands were drawn into the shaft and the injury 
in question occurred. ( 1 T. 35-44) 
The only injury with which we are here concerned 
is the injury to her right hand. She received injuries 
to her left arm, but with those we are not here con-
cerned. As a result of the injury to her right hand, 
it was necessary to operate the thumb at the proxi-
mal j'oint. This was done by Dr. Dumke of Ogden, Utah 
(R. 20). Actually the thumb was not operated exactly 
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at the proximal joint, there being a remnant of proximal 
phalanx (R. 26), but for all practical purposes ·we con-
cede the operation of the thun1b at the proximal joint. 
The thun1b was pronounced healed and she was released 
fro1n the doctor on August 26, 1940 (1 T. 15 and 21). 
The applicant, defendant here, testified that at the time 
of the first hearing the thumb was better than at the 
ti~ne she was released as surgically ~ealed on August 
26 (1 T. 15). 
The applicant, as heretofore stated, \vas employed 
on July 3, 1940 and was allowed to go to w~ork without 
the employment certificate provided by Section 14-6-5, 
Compiled La,vs ·of Utah, 1933 as amended by Session 
Laws of Utah, 1933, page 17. The reasons given from 
the evidence for this situati~on are fo·und in the tran-
s-cript of the first hearing, pages 25-29, and show that in 
1939 the n·epartment or Division ·of Unemployment of 
the Industrial Commission called the Manager of the 
Royal Canning Company and requested hi1n to secure 
his . employees thr,ough that department. This he did 
through the season of 1939 by phonii~g the Department 
his needs and the Department would then send him the 
girls and women required. 'Vhen the season of 1940 
began, the Department again requested that he use its 
services in ·securing employees, which he consente'rl to 
do. The Department would· comply with his request 
and send him sufficient empl,oyees to answer his pur-
poses. This applied equally to minors and aqults. In 
.the first part. of July, 1940, he phoned the D·epartment 
and requested it to send him some employees to work 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
in the eherries and apricots. None of the nnnor em-
ployees shO\Yed up \Yith the en1ployn1ent et:>rtificates re-
quired by la"·· On 8aturday, J nly 6, the girls tried to 
get their employment certificates froin the Superintend-
ent of Schools of Ogden as required by the Child \Vel-
fare statute heretofore referred to, Chapter 11, Session 
La\Ys of lTtah, 19·33, and \Yere told that they \vould have 
to come to the office bet\\-een 8 :00 and 9 :00 as there was 
nobod~- there other than at that hour to issue the per-
nlits; that they \Yould haYe to first secure employn1ent, 
then apply to the office for an application for certificate, 
take it home, secure the signature of their parents, come 
to the plant and secure the approval of the management, 
then return to the Superintendent's office and get the 
permits.- This situation ''Tith the school office .open only 
one hour "\v.ould cause the girls two days loss of time. 
The ~lanager of the Royal Canning Co1npany on Mon-
day, July 8, called the office of the Superintendent of 
Schools and was told he would not be back until the 
afternoon. The Manager called again Tuesday morning 
·and the Superintendent \Yas again out. That afternoon 
the Superintendent called the Manager, who asked him 
why they could not get the permits and he told the 
Manager that the person in charge \Yas out of town 
but that he \YOuld have someone come to the plant on 
,, ... ednesday and issue the applications. A representative 
of the Superintendent's office caine to the plant on \"Ved-
nesday, issued the applications, returned on Thursday 
noon and wrote the permits. So the Manager had been 
trying for a \Yeek to get the office of the Superintendent 
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of Schools to perform its duty under the statute and 
had been unable to do so. In the meantime, on Tuesday, 
July 9, the applicant was injured and after that Mrs. 
Shupe of the Industrial Commission came to Ogden and 
told the Superintendent that they must keep their office 
open between 9 :00 and 5 :00 as required by law, in .order 
that these minors might secure their employment cer-
tificates. This also appears in a detailed report to 
the Industrial Commission found at R. 1, 2, and 3. It 
thus appears that a department of the State through 
the Industrial Commission urged the employment of 
these minors by the Royal Canning Company and sent 
them there without employment certificates and another 
division of the State, the Superintendent of Schools, by 
failing to perform his duty as required by law, made it 
impossible for the minors to secure. their employment 
certificates and in· the meantime an accident happened 
to Miss Hughes. 
As heretofore stated, the applicant's right thumb 
was amputated at approximately the proximal joint, 
which \vas surgically healed August 26, 19·40. Between 
the first and second hearings, on its own motion, the 
Industrial Comn1ission held a hearing before a medical 
advisory board appointed by it, although there was no 
question at the first hearing concerning the exact extent 
of the injuries sustained by the applicant. At the 
n1edical advisory hearing certain arbitrary conclusions 
were arrived at with nothing to support them that the 
applicant had suffered a disability of approximately 
seventy-five per cent at the wrist (R. 16). As a result 
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of these conclusions the second hearing- was held and 
medical testin1ony introduced, which shows that the ap-
plicant has suffered a norn1al an1putation of the thumb 
at app-roximately the proxin1a.l j·oint. 
The Commission later held the third hearing and 
although the evidence is undisputed that the appli-
. 
cant's weekly \Yage \Yas only $12.90 and that this was 
about the average earned by other employees doing 
the san1e \York, regardless of their age or experience, 
the C-ommission found \Yith no evidence whatever to 
support the finding, that because of the applicant's age 
and experience she might reas~onably be expected to ea.rn 
sufficient to entitle her to compensation at the rate of 
$16.00 per week, which would bring her wages some-
''here in the neighborhood of :$26.00 or ·$27.00 a week, 
or more than double what she was actually earning. 
As a result ~of these hearings the Commission 
awarded the applicant compensation against the Royal 
Canning Company under Section 14-..6-27 of .Chapter 11, 
Session Laws of Utah, 1933, and a like amount against 
the Continental Casualty Company, as the carrier of the 
Workmen's Compensation for the Royal Canning Com-
pany. The Commission found that her wages at the 
tin1e of injury entitled her to compensation at the rate 
of $8.31 per week for the period of temporary total 
disability ending August 25, 1940, in the sum of $54.61 
against each of the plaintiff's (we shall hereafter dis-
cuss the matter of wages) and in addition, instead of 
awarding her the thirty weeks provided by the statute 
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for loss of the thumb at the proximal joint, found that 
she had a seventy-five per cent disability at the wrist 
and gave her an additional one hundred and twelve and 
# 
a half weeks, not at the rate of $8.31 per week, but at 
the rate of $16.00 per week, making a total award against 
each of the plaintiffs for the additional period of 
$1800.00. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS. 
It is the plaintiffs' contention that there is no justi-
fication for the award· of double eompensation; that the 
statute provides a fixed and definite sum for the loss 
of the thu1nb at the proximal joint and that the Com-
mission was without authority to increase the weekly 
period beyond that provided by statute; and that there 
is absolutely no evidence to jus'tify the finding that the 
applicant after August 25, 1940 would earn sufficient. 
money to entitle her to compensation at the rate of 
$16.00 per week. 
ARGUMENT. 
At the ~outset may we state that we have no quarrel 
with the Comnlission 's findings that the applicant, Miss 
Hughes, was earning sufficient to entitle her to .compen-
sation at the rate of $8.31 per .week. The testimony 
shows, however, that during the six days she worked 
she a~tually earned $12.90, which was about the same 
average of the other girls who 'vere working with her 
in the same kind of work (Defendants' Exhibits 3 and 
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4:: R,. 31, ~1~). It is true that the first report of injury 
(R. 7) states that she was working seven days a week 
at 30 cents per hour, but this report, the testimony 
shows, is not true (3 T. 11, 1:2). The testimony ·all 
through the east'\ sho\YS that the girls received 30 cents 
an hour only "-bile they 'vere "~orking and the time they 
"'"orked depended entirely upon the availability of fruit. 
\\~ e shall discuss the \Yag-e question, however, In more 
detail under subdivision III hereafter. 
I. 
1\~ e feel there is absolutely no justification for a 
double award in this case .. It is true that the Child 
Labor La.,v, Chap. 11, Session Laws of 19:33, subdivision 
5, provides that minors under eighteen shall not be 
employed \Yithout an employment certificate. The chap-
ter, ho\vever, makes it the duty of the school authorities 
t.o issue the certificate. They may refuse to issue the 
certificate, but that was not done with any of these 
girls. The Industrial Commission is charged with the 
duty of enforcing the provisions of the chapter. In 
construing the law we must take into consideration all 
of its pr.ovisions and· construe them altogether to ac-
complish the purposes desired. Section 11 provides 
that if a certificate of employment is not on file, the 
enforcement officers may demand the empl.oyer to secure 
the ·certificate within seven days or refuse to employ 
the minor. It thus seems apparent that under facts 
such as \Ye have here, where the Industrial Commission 
itself sends the minors to work without certificates and 
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therefore ha·s. ikn9wledge .of the situat~on; that it is the 
duty of the Industrial Commission, before any liability 
can .attach to the employer, to a:llow him to produce the 
certificate upon seven days notice. So far a.s the em-
ployer is concerned in this case we have an even more 
favorable situation. The Industrial Commission re-
quested the employer to employ the girls to assist in 
the unemployment situation in the state. The employer 
was engaged in the canning of perishable fruits, which 
must be handled in1mediately in order to prevent them 
from spoiling. The employer consented to assist the 
Industrial Commission in its efforts to relieve unemploy-
ment and whenever it desired empl,oyees, it so notified 
the Commission and the Commission itself sent the em-
ployees to the ·einployment. The Commission knew that 
en1ployment certificates were required and that they could 
only be secured from the school authorities and yet it 
made no effort until after the accident in question to 
require the s-chool authorities to perform their duties 
in the premises. The failure to have employment certi-
ficates on file was not the fault of the employer. It w.as 
the fault primarily of the school authorities in failing 
t~o perform their duties, and secondarily, of the Industrial 
Commission employment department, fi~st in failing to 
see that the people it sent to work had -certificates, and 
seoondly in not requiring the school authorities to per-
form their duties. So that if any wrong was committed 
by the employer it was entirely induced by the public 
authorities with whom the employer was trying to. co-
operate. 
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It must be remembered that this accident did not 
happen beeause the nrinor had no employment certificate. 
Had she w•orked on the side of the belt where she was 
placed and used the stick proYided for her to dislodge 
the cherries from the chute, she would not have been 
injured. The school authorities did not think ·that the 
employment "'"as injurious to the minors because they 
issued certificates to the other girls enga.g~ed in the ~same 
class of work. 
It is established doctrine in this state that the public 
authorities cannot induce the· comn1ission of an offense 
and· then hold the offender liable. State v. McCornish, 
59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637. In this case this court quotes: · 
,,,,~hen it is 1nade to appear that the offense 
charged """as induced by a. detectiv·e or other per-
son, * . * * hoth the prosecuting officers and 
the trial courts should carefully scrutinize the 
evidence and should permit no conviction to he 
had, or, if had, to stand, in case the off-ense was 
induced as aforesaid.-" (Italics added). 
This is the law generally as is shown in the recent case 
of Sanders v. State, (Oklahoma) 113 P. (2d) 198, where-
in the court says : 
"It has been held that where officers or those 
acting under them first suggest the comn1ission 
of the criminal act or lu.re the accused into the 
commission of such acts, that sound public policy 
will not uphold a. conviction.'' (Italics added). 
I ' 
It is true that these are actual criminal cases, bu't the 
Child W-elfare statute under consideration here is :also 
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a penal statute and the employer has been subjected to 
a penalty thereunder by the Industrial Commission. He 
has been subjected to a penalty for no fault of his own 
and for doing a thing he was induced to do by officers 
of the state and because other officers of the state failed 
and neglected to perform their duties under ·the law. 
V\Te did everything that we eould to cooperate with 
the public authorities to relieve unemployment and 
everything that we could to secure the employment certi-
ficates and it \Vas through no fault of ours that the 
per1nits were not secured and it was through no fault 
of ours that the girl was injured. It seems highly 
unjust and inequitable that we should he penalized when 
we have done no actual wrong. There is no question 
involved here of employing girls who had been refused 
employment certificates. Had the school authorities been 
on the .job,. this girl would have had her certificate, the 
same as the rest of them got theirs. ·So that the pur-
poses of the act were not frustrated by anything that 
we did and this court could very well say, under Section 
11, that under the circumstances it was the duty of the 
Industrial Comn1ission, after it had sent the girls to 
work, to give us seven days within which to secure their 
·certificates. 
Evert should this court hold that we are liable f~or 
the penalties pres.cribed by Section 27 ·of the chapter, 
there is nothing in the record to justify any award 
against the Royal Canning Company other than the 
period of temporary total disability, which expired Au-
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gust 25, 1940, plus 30 additi~onal \Yeeks at $8.31 per week 
for the loss of the thumb at the proximal joint. 
\\""" e earnestly insist, ho""eYer, that under the facts 
in this ease the penalty ag·aiust us is unauthorized and 
unjust and as to the Royal Canning Co1npany the award 
~hould be annulled; that the statute is penal and the 
eonunission of any offense, if any vvas eomnri tted, was 
induced by public officials, and that we were lured into 
it by their conduct. 
II. 
~-\.s heretofore sho\Yn, the claimant suffered the loss 
of the right thumb at approximately the proximal joint. 
Our statute, Secti~on 42-1-62, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as amended by Chapter 41, pages 80 and 81, Ses-
sion La 'Ys of Utah, 1937, provides : ''For loss of * * * 
one thm11b at the proximal joint, 30 weeks.'' There are 
nurnerous other specific provisions and at the end of 
the section appears the follo-vving: 
"For anY other disfio·urement or the loss of ~ 0 
bodily function not otherruise provided for here-
in~ such period of compensati~on as the commis-
sion shall deem equitable and in proportion to 
compensation in other cases, not e~~ceeding two 
hundred weeks." (Italics added). 
Another specific provision of the chapter is that for the 
loss of one hand the payments shall be 150 weeks. In 
spite of the fact that this claimant has not lost her 
hand and has all of the digits of the right hand with 
the exception of the right thumb, the ·comn1ission pro-
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'ceeded upon· the theory that she had. lost. seventy-fiv~ 
per <·ent of the use of the hand. 
The statute ·is <·lear and explicit that for the loss 
of. the thu1nb at the proximal joint the additional com-
pensation shall be 30 "reeks and it is only for any l~oss 
or disfigurement not otherwise provided for that addi-
tional compensati,on may be awarded. In other words, 
where there is a specific and definite loss, the Legislature 
has arbitrarily fixed the amount of compensation and 
it is beyond the power of the Commission to change it. 
If this vvere not true, then n1edical experts upon whom the 
Commission might call would fix the amount of com-· 
pensation by their opinions and the definite legislative 
enactment would be overthrown· by the medical experts, 
vvhose judgrnent would be substituted for that of the 
.Legislature. The probable reason the Legislature fixed 
these definite amounts for specific losses was to take 
them out of this realm of speculation so that the amounts 
of compensation would be certain and sure. All the 
courts hold that compensation statutes are not designed 
to grant exact compensation for inju~ies, but to make 
it certain and sure that an injured employee will re-
ceive a definite and precise amount. If the Industrial 
Commission for the loss of a thumb may conclude that 
there has been a loss of seventy-five per cent of the use 
of the hand at the wrist, it might also ·conclude that if 
the thumb \vas ;oil the left hand, there had been no loss of 
the ·use of the hand and ther~fore refuse to award any 
co.mpensati·on, or determine that there was only fiv~ per 
cent loss ~ind make its award on that basis. ·Assume for 
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·pli.rpose~ ·of illustration that one in the legal profession 
lost his thun1b on the left hand. The Industrial C·om-
mission mig-ht ,~ery \Yell assume that he had suffered 
little or no loss and 1nedica.l experts might so testify, 
' but that "~ould not depriYe hin1, if he was a.n employee 
of someone, of a definite amount prescribed by the 
Legislature for the loss of his thumb. A pianist might 
lose his little finger at the proximal joint and nearly 
every d~octor would testify that he thereby had lost the 
complete use of his hand and upon such testimony, if 
the Industrial Commission is right in this ease, it ,could 
a\Yard him 150 weeks ·instead of 9 weeks as provided 
b}T the statute.- Of course, the loss of the thumb tre-
mendously impairs the use of the hand, bu~ it is not 
the l·os-s of the hand and there is no los.s of the hand 
~n this case, although the Commission has based its 
award upon that basis. Sex or vocation are not the 
determining factors in the question of use. Because 
thi.s applicant is a girl and can't peel potatoes or sew 
is not the determining fact~or in fixing her compensa-
tion. 
Dr. Dumke is the man who performed the opera-
tion. He did not testify. But at R. 20 is found his 
report to the Industrial Commission, in which he states: 
"She has an amputation .of her right thumb at the prox-
imal j~oint. She·uses her hand well, but her entire thumb 
is gone, giving her the usual disability which you have 
with the loss of the entire thumb.'' .Thus the doctor 
·who performed the amputation is on record to the effect 
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that the claimant has only the usual loss that comes 
with the l·oss of a thumb. 
At the first hearing Dr. Dumke's assistant, Dr. J. L. 
Price, testified that Dr: Dumke's report was correct 
(1 T. 19) and that there were no cords broken above 
where the .scar extends ( 1 T. 20). He also testified 
that applicant's Exhibit B (R. 14), which is another 
report by Dr. Dumke, was also correct (1 T. 20) and in 
that report Dr. Dumke says that the result of the ampu-
tation is good. The applicant herself testified at the 
time of the hearing the thumb was in better condition 
than when she was discharged on August 26 ( 1 T. 15). 
Dr. Price further testified that the loss of the thumb 
would not impair the arm aside from discomfort (1 T. 
21) : He was personally familiar with the . applicant 
from the time of the injury all through her period of 
convalescence. We thus have the testimony of these 
two doctors, who personally attended the case, that we 
have here simply the usual ease of the amputation of 
the thumb. 
Next comes the Commission 'On its own motion and 
has the applicant appear before its own medical advisory 
board in Salt Lake City (R. 16). The medical advisory 
hoard, without stating any reasons therefor, conclude 
that her disability is approximately seventy-five per 
cent at the wrist. It gave absolutely no reason for this 
·conclusion, and neither this court nor anyone else can 
deternlin~ why they made such an estimate-a clear 
case of substituting their judgment for that of the Legis-
lature. The medical advisory board did say, ho,vever, 
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that she \Ya~ able to clench the fist and extend and abduet 
all thtt fiugPr~ "~it hin n·ormal range. The only reason 
they gaYe for their conclusion of seYenty-five per cent 
i~ that she is right-handed and has lost the use of the 
right thumb. This bald conclusion of the ·medical ad-
visory board was unsatisfactory to the plain tiffs here 
and the Oommission again on its own motion held a 
second hearing at Salt Lake City, Utah. This, in spite 
of the fact that both sides rested at the first hearing 
and neither side asked for a. rehearing or a reopening 
of the ~ase. Both sides were represented by counsetl 
at the first hearing and both sides int:voduced all the 
eYidence that they desired. Notwithstanding this, the 
Co1nmission on its ·own motion conducted a second hear-
ing at Salt Lake City, Utah, a.t which time nobody but 
doctors testified. The Commission called two of the doc-
tors who acted on its medical advis,ory board, D~. Hicken 
and Dr. Capener. Dr. Hicken again stated that his 
opinion "\vas that the applicant had lost seventy-five 
per cent-of the use of _the hand at the wrist, but when 
asked to give his reasons he had none, other than that 
the. thumb ''Tas the most valuable one of the digits. He 
said ( 2 T. 4) : ''The applicant has free use· of the second, 
third and fourth digits and grasps things well. There is 
apparently no change of thermal sensation or signs of 
atrophy of these muscles.'' He te-stified that the p-rox-
imal joint is not gone and the metacarpal bone is still 
there. He testified that if she had lost the metacarpal 
bone completely, she would be worse off than she is 
now. (2 T. 7). 
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The statute for the lo.ss of the thumb and the rneta-
carpal bone only al~ows 60 weeks, Session Laws of Utah, 
1937, page 80, and yet the Industrial Commission here 
h~s awarded her 112lj2 weeks when she is better off than 
if she had lost the metcarpal bone eompletely. This 
clearly indicates the vice of permitting the Industrial 
Commission to do what it has done in this ease. If it can 
do so, then there is no way by which employers or 
insurance carriers can fix their rates and as a result not 
only they, but their employees as well, suffer from 
such uncertainties. We think this is one of. the reasons 
that the Legislature intended to and did remove these 
specific injuries from the realm of speculation. 
Dr. Hicken did testify that she had some scar tissue 
which interfered with the function of the wrist, but only 
because. she has no phalange-s on the thumb t~o get Ia 
g,ood grasp· of the hand. That is true in any amputation 
of the thumb, so that there is nothing more unusual in 
this case than there is in any amputation of the thumb. 
Dr. Capener testified substantially the same as Dr. 
Hicken. He, however, said that he based his estimate of ' 
seventy-five per cent on the fact that she had scar tissue 
which might at s~ome future time be injured by some 
slight accident. He said (2 T. 15) that his answer was 
based on this scar tissue being present and because of 
what might happen in the future, but not for anything 
that had now occurred. His opinion is pure speculation 
and conjecture and such opinion, this court has re-
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peatedly held, n~ \Ye shall hereafter :show, 1s not evi-
dence. 
Dr. James P. Kerby, an expert in X-ray, also te.sti-
fied at the second hearing. He testified that he had 
not only exa1nined the ap1plicant but had a picture of her 
right hand and that the right hand and the 'vrist region 
were normal with the exception that the thumb had been 
amputated at approximately the p·roximal joint. He 
stated that she had not sustained as complete a loss 
as she ".,.ould have done had she lost the thumb com-
pletely at the proximal joint. He further testified that 
the thumb presented the usual appearance when there is 
a good surgical amputation and that there was no injury 
to the metacarpal bone (2 T. 11). His report was 
received in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit 2 (R. 26) 
and shows· that there is normaJl appearance .of the lower 
half of the radius and ulna and of the carpal and meta-
c.arpal bones, and no bony pathology . 
...._>\.lso testifying at the second hearing was Dr. 
}Iartin ·c. Lindem, 'vho had ·examined the applicant and 
her X-rays. He als-o testified that the metacarpal bone 
is intact and that the muscle attachments to it are .all 
intact and that her injury is well healed; that she has 
only the usual situation in an amputation of the thumb 
at the proximal joint; that she has normal movement of 
the hand (2 T. 16, 17). The Commissioner condu0ting 
the hearing insisted on the doctor giving his· opinion as 
t.o· the question of percentage ·of los.s as ·compared to a 
normal hand. The doctor did not care· to answer the 
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qnPstion and clearly indicated that it is impossible to 
HllH\\'t~r su<·h a question, stating that that depends on 
what she does-would be ~one hundred per cent loss to 
sOUl<l people auc.l no loss to others. When pressed, how-
ever, by the Uo1nmissioner, for an answer, the doctor 
aHs\\·ered: 
~'I ,,·ould ha Ye to put an arbitrary estirnation 
on that and I don't think it can be compensated 
but I would say between 50){ and 100%. 
COl\1. JUGLER: 50)/o actual loss·~ 
A. I think it should be put do\\'n at about 
50}~, and that V\rould be arbitrary. 
i\1R. J():\'"ES: That would he true in every 
case? 
A. I should put that arbitrary esti1nate and 
call it 50;;. . " 
This clearly indicates that any estima~te made by 
the doctors is purely arbitrary and guesswork and it is 
for that very reason that the Legislature provided a 
specific amount. The testimony shows \vi~thout dispute 
that all the applicant has is the usual loss of a thumb 
at the proxin1al joint. Of course, it ,,~ould be very 
difficult to co1npensate her at all for this loss but the 
,,~isdo1n of the statute is not for our discu,ssion but is 
solely within the discretion of the Legislature. The 
only tin1e the Industrial Commission can grant addi-
tional compensation is for disfigurement and losses not 
otherwise provided for. But in this case \:ve have a loss 
that is specifically provided for. The cases are uniform 
in holding that where there is provision for a specific 
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los~ the Gonunission has no po,ver or jurisdiction to 
grant any eo1npen~ation other than that specifically 
provided for. 
In Spring Canyon ()oal Co. v. Industrial Co'ln.mis-
sian. 57 Utah 208, 193 P. S~l, th~ e1nployee l:ost the use 
of his leg, "·hich "-:as specifically provided for in the 
statute. This case \Yas decided before the 1919 amend-
ment, but the principle involYed there is the same as is 
involved here. This court said, referring to loss of mem-
bers where there is a fixed and definite amount, at page 
:212 of the lT tah R.eports : 
'' .J._\s to these amounts the commission has no 
discretion; "\Yhen the loss of the member is ascer-
tained the law specifically determines the coin-
pensation. '' · 
And further ·on, on page 213, this -court states : 
'' \V .. e .are constrained to hold that the Ian-
guage last quoted is mandatory in hoth form 
and substance, that it definitely fixes the conl-
pensation to be paid for the loss of specific mem-
bers of the body, and that the compensation thus 
fL~ed is exclusive of any other compensation for 
dis.ability arising solely fron1 the loss of the par-
ticular member in question.'' 
In the case of North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 58 Utah 486, 200 P. 111, \vhere the employee 
lost m~ore than one finger, this court clearly shows that 
it is only when there is a loss of more than one finger 
that the decreased usability of the hand is a fair 1nethod 
of compensation. The court pointed out that it is ·a 
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matter of common knowledge that if only one finger is 
lost, the adjoining fingers begin to function for the miss-
ing rnember and soon acquire the power to a gre.at extent 
of taking place of the lost finger, but if more than one 
finger is lost this situation is not true. 
The Commission in arriving at its conclusions here 
apparently considered the vocational aspects of the case. 
This the Commission may not do, as this court has held 
in Broderick v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 210, 
224 P. 87 6. In that case, page 217 of the Utah Reports, 
the court also said : 
''Then again, in the event that the en1ployee has 
.suffered a specific injury, he is entitled to a 
specific amount fixed by ·statute for such injury, 
and this is so a~lthough he suffered no diminution 
of l·oss of wages or earnings.'' 
In that case the court referred to the Spring Canyon 
Case, supra; pointed out that' in that case the statute 
made a specific allowance for a specific injury, and that 
the C.ommis-sion can not add ·anything to the amount fixed 
by statute. 
In Aetna Lif'e Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 6.4 Utah 230, 228 P. 1081, the court said at page 
236 of the Utah Reports: 
''the injury resulted in the loss of a member of 
the body, the .compensation n1ust be fixed in ac-
cordance with the schedule, which provides a 
specific compensation for the loss of ·a particular 
member ·of the body. That is, if, 'as in this case, 
the injury re-sults in 'the loss of one leg at or so 
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near the hip joint as to preelude the use· of: an 
artificial limb,' the payment of the week~y amount 
must continue for 180 weeks, and no more.'' 
It is true that the court in that case did say that if other 
injuries oc.curred in addition to the specific one, the Com~ 
mission might haYe s~ome dis-cretion. But this court 
continued: . 
'" \\nen the loss of the leg occurs, or the loss of 
function is eomplete, he would then receive the 
amount fixed by the statute for the loss of the 
leg." 
J:n that case the court pointed out, as we have above, 
that if the Commission -can increase the statutory com-
pensation, 'it can likewise ·decrease it and. thus deprive 
an injured employee of what is legally due him. The 
court -on page 241 again approved the Spring Canyon 
Case, supr.a. 
That the disfigurement caused here by the amputa~ 
tion is not con1p·ensable other than for the loss of the· 
thumb would appear from the case of Denv,er & R. G. w~ 
R. Co. v. l'Ypdustrial Commission, 73 Utah 86, 272 P. 239, 
wherein this court at page 91 of the Utah Reports says: 
"The term 'other disfigurement' appearing in 
the statute does not seem to have any practical 
significance. There is unquestionably a disfigure-
ment when the hand is entirely lost and when 
the Legislature allowed, for such injury, compen-
sation for 150 weeks it must· be assumed that it 
to.ok into consideration disfigur~ment as-· well as 
loss of function.'' 
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Again in the V~tkelich v.lndustrial Commission case, 
62 Utah 486, 220 P. 1073, this eourt at page 490 of the 
lJ t nh Reports said: 
''By providing a different basis of compen~ 
·Sa tion f~or particularly described injuries, those 
injuries are to be excluded from general pro vi-. 
sions 'Nhich Vlould .otherwise include them.'' 
While it is true that this court has held that it is 
not necessary for the Commission to make findings, in 
the case of American Smelt. & Ref. Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 79 Utah 302, 10 P. (2d) 918, at pages 306-7 
of the Utah Reports it held that when the Commission 
does make findings, this court can test the sufficiency of 
the findings and that they must be based upon competent 
evidence: There is no competent evidence in this record 
that the applicant sustained anything more than the 
usual loss of the thumb. As we have pointed out, an 
examination of Dr. Capener 's evidence' shows that his 
conclusion is based up,on a possibility of what might 
happen in the future and Dr. Hicken's testimony is a 
rnere guess or conjecture. 
In a very recent case, Pennock v. Newhouse Realty 
Co., 97 Utah 408, 93 P. (2d) 482, this court pointed out 
the vice of such evidence, and rules out the medical 
testimony on the ground that it was purely speculative. 
The question is not what might happen, but the sit-
uation as it actuaHy exists. The court says at page 415 
of the Utah Reports : 
"To state what generally happens in such cases 
leaves it entirely to the speculation of the jury 
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as to \Yht.~ther or not it is happening· to thP plniu-
tiff. ~' 
The eYidenre here clearly sho"·s that the pl~intiff has a 
g·ood reeoYery, an excellent surg-ical anrputation, the 
pictures sho"~ a normal hand and \Yrist except for the 
loss of the thumb. In eYery an1putation there would 
be scar tissue and to speculate that at s.ome future 
time the scar tissue might become involved is entirely 
beyond the province of the Industrial Commission. The 
testimony of Dr .. Lindem clearly illustrates the vice of 
permitting speculation in a case such as this. When 
compelled to testify, he said. his evidence was purely 
arbitrary and clearly indicated that he did not think it 
\\-as a matter of his opinion. 
The courts in other states are 1n accord with the 
rule for which we are contending to the effect that 
where there is a specific schedule, no additional payment 
may· be exacted. The Supreme C1ourt of Minnesota in 
the. case of Sheldon v·. Gopher Granite Co., 219 N. W. 
867, says at page 868 : 
•' The statute takes no .account of the fact that 
certain of the fingers on. the hand are of more 
use or service than others, or that the thumb is, 
perhaps, more indispensable than any .other fin-
ger.'' 
and continuing: 
''The instant case is f.or the loss of a n1ernber or 
part of a member specifically compensated. By 
44 relator is likewise excluded, for his loss is 
enun1erated in the preceding subdivision 6 (c).'' 
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'rhe Pennsylvania Supreme Court 1n the case of 
Lentee v. Lucci, 119 Atl. 132, says: 
''In other words, this legislative mandate fixed 
the amount to be paid in such cases, without con-
sidering, but including, all incapacity to labor 
that may be connected therewith, whether such 
incapacity he t1otal, partial, or no incapacity at 
all.'' 
And further : 
"The compensation mentioned ·is restricted by 
precise language, regardless of the fact that a 
permanent injury might otherwise aff·ect capacity 
to work. The standard thus fixed is in the nature 
of -compensation for the damage resulting from 
the loss of the members there named, without 
regard t1o personal capacity to labor, or loss of 
earning power.'' 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court continues: 
''But, in these case~s, where it is claimed that 
some other part of the body is affected, it must 
definitely and positively appear that it is so 
affected as a. direct result of the permanent in-
jury; the casual connection must be con1plete, 
~and, further, the disability must be separate and 
distinqt from that which normally follows an 
injury under paragraph (c), and must endure 
beyond the time therein 1nentioned. There must 
be a destruction, derangement, or deficiency in 
the organs of the other parts of the body. · It 
does not include pain, annoyance, inconveniences, 
disability to work, or anything that rrtay come 
wnder the ter1n 'all disability,' or normally result-
ing .from the permanent injury." (Italics added). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court again says : 
~ '..._\.ppellan t 's argn1nen t is based on a \vrong-
theory-that ineapaeity, and not injury, controls 
this section.'' 
The Supreme C.ourt of Ohio in the case of State v. 
Tndustrial Corn1nissi.on, 183 N. E. 871, says: 
'·For loss of member the a \Yard has no rela-
tion to the · in1pair1nent of his earning· capacity 
during- the continuance thereof,' but, on the con-
.trary, is arbitrarily fixed by the statute.'' 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in South-
land Gasoline Co. v. Bowlin, 3 P. (2d) 663, says: 
'''\ ... here the statute fixes the number of weeks 
that the payment for various specific injuries 
shall continue, it is, of course, error to award 
compensation for a longer time.'' 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Colorado Fuel 
& Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Pae. 955, an-
nounces the same rule, as does also the Supreme Court 
of Arizona in the case of Ujevich v. Inspiration Cons. 
Copper Co., 25 P. (2d) 273, wherein the court say•s: 
''The Legislature selected certain kinds of in-
juries or losses that empl1oyees suffer and fixed 
a definite sum or a rule for ascertaining that sum 
and said, in effect, such sun1 together \vith the 
temporary total disability compensation shall be 
in full satisfaction of the employee's loss. It 
provided con1pensation for such loss whether any 
pern1anent disability to earn wages follovved or 
not. It assumed that every loss enumerated 
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:, ·r.' .1 ,-•.• , would ··cause some per1nanent loss of earning 
. powe:r, and arbitrarily fixed the compensation 
·; 
1
·: · ' • theref1or. :n 
~\· f 
It would appear, therefore, under the facts in this 
~~&.~.~' ,that the ~Legislature, having fixed an additional 
thirty weeks for the loss of a thunlb at the proximal 
joirit, has precluded the Cq1nmission from awarding any 
further ·compensation for such loss. The evidence fails 
t1o sustain the Con1mission in its award of seventy-five 
per c.ent of. the. lo.ss of the hand .at the wrist, since it 
conclnsive1ly appears that all there is here is the usual 
• '' l 
~.mputation of the thumb. 
III. 
Our statute, Section 42-1-71, Revised Statutes of 
U tab, 1933, provides : 
"If it is established that the injured em-
ployee was of such age and experience -vvhen 
injured that under natural conditions his wages 
would be expected to increase, that. fact n1ay be 
c.onsidered in arriving· at his average \veekly 
·wage.'' 
Because of this section the Commission held the 
thi~d hearing and awarded the applicant compensation 
L ., . 
aft'er August 25, ~940, at the rate of. $16.00 a week. 
· . , In our opinion it is somewhat fruitless to discuss 
this .pha.se of the ease. because there is no semblance 
of evidence tu support this phase of the a ward. The 
evidence sho\\~s without conflict that the applicant and 
those i engaged in ·similar occupations, regardless of age 
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or experience, earned approximately the same wages 
as the ap·plica.nt did at the tin1e of injury (Defendant's 
Exhibits 3 and 4: R. 31, 32). The record shows without 
conflict that the applicant was being paid the maximum 
"'"ages fior the \York in which she was engaged (3 T. 9 
and 10); that 1940 was a good year and it would be pure 
speculation as to· whether she would earn more or less 
in other years ( 3 T. 15, 16, 20, 21, 22). Tlie evidence; 
further shows without conflict that age and experien-ce 
are not con~rolling factors in this industry in ·earning 
capacity. The law is well settled that the increase in 
wages contemplated is the increase in the occupation 
pursued at the time of injury. It seems somewhat un-
necessary to discuss this phase of the case, but inasmuch 
as the I~dustrial Commission went out· of its way. to 
a'vard this applicant far more than she was entitled to, 
such discussion becomes necessary. 
There is not a word of evidence in the record that 
she would ever have earned or ever be able to earn 
sufficient to entitle her to compensation at the rate of 
$16.00 p·er week. As we have hereto:flore stated, com-
pensation at that rate ~ould be based upon wages earned 
by her of $26.00 or $27.09 per week. The evidence shows 
that the applicant is under-nourished, has had an· oper-
ation for the removal .of gall stones, and that since her 
injury has had her gall bladder and tonsils removed, 
and that she is in very poor .physical condition, no:ne of· 
which had reference to the accident (3 T. 23 and R.· 11). 
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The Commission found that her actual wages en-
titled her to compensation at the rate of $8.31 p·er week. 
With this finding we have ll'O quarrel, although it is 
somewhat higher than. the statute provides. As here-
tofore stated, the first report of injury that she was 
working seven days per week at thirty cents an hour 
is not true (3 T. 12). The girls only worked when there 
was fruit for them to work on and they were 1only paid 
the actual time that they worked, and the evidence shows 
without dispute that none of them earned as high as 
$21.00 per week and could not have done so in the year 
in which they were employed, which year was a good 
year (3 T. 21, 22). 
A statute similar to ours has seldom been construed, 
but the courts that have construed it hold that any 
increase in wages is to be considered only in the occu-
pation in which the employee was engaged and is not to 
be based upon the probable wage, but actually what was 
earned in the industry at the time the e1np1loyee reached 
majority. ,JVes~ern Pac. R. Co., v. lndu,strial Accident 
Cornmission, ('Cal.) 181 P. 787. And ·in the Massachu-
setts case of In re Gagnon, 117 N. E. 321, the court said: 
''The s-cheme of the act is that the employer 
shall be insured against the losses fr,om personal 
injury to employees arising out of and in the 
course ·of their employment. The cost of such 
insurance can be determined so long as the basis 
on which compensation is t~o he reckoned is 'vages 
paid by the e1nployer. It can readily be determ-
ined so long as the standard fixed by the defini-
tion of average weekly wages in part 5, S-ec. 2, 
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above quoted, is .follo\vetl But it would ~be a 
1natter of utter uneerta.inty if the compensation 
to be paid should depend, not upon wages paid, 
but upon \Yages \Yhich the Industrial Accident 
Board after an injury may find upon independent 
eYidence, perhaps not readily open to the em-
ployer during the period of empl1oyment, that the 
injured employee might have earned in some 
other employment or field of activity. 
" ~ \\""" ag·es' as used in the statute must be 
taken to refer to the only wages referred to any-
\Y here in the act (with the exception noted), 
namely, the 'vages earned in the particular em-
ployment out of which the injury arose.'' 
The finding of the Industrial Commission that the 
applicant would have earned sufficient money to entitle 
her to compensation at the rate of $16.00 per week is 
based upon mere surmise and conjecture. This court 
has repeatedly held that such a finding can not be 
sustained. Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com· 
mission of Utah, 75 Utah 220, 284 P. 313, wherein the 
court says: ''An award cannot rest upon mere conjec-
ture or possibility." See also Aetna Life Insurance Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 415, 231 P. 442, where 
the same rule is announced in the following language 
on page 420 of the Utah Reports: 
''A finding of a material fact cannot sustain 
an award, unless the finding is supported by 
substantial evidence.'' 
We respectfully submit that there is not a word of 
evidence in this record to show t'ha t this applicant would 
e:ver have . earned 1one cent more than she was earning 
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at the time of the injury. There is not a word of evi-
dence to support the Commission's finding that she 
would ever earn sufficient money to entitle her to. com-
pensation at· the rate of $16.00 per week. _ In fact, her 
physical condition, which has no ref.erence whatever to 
the accident, would indicate that she would not be in a 
position to work at all in the o-ccupation that she was 
pursuing at the time of the injury. 
We, therefore, respe·ctfully submit that any one of 
the three propositions w-e have advanced is sufficient_ to 
annul the award of the Industrial Commission. - The 
insurance carrier has no objection whatever to paying 
compensation for temporary total disability at the rate 
of $8.31 per week to August 25, 1940, and .an additi~onal 
·30 weeks thereafter, together with proper medical costs, 
but beyond this plaintiffs earnestly insist they have no 
legal liability. It is true that the applicant has sus-
tained a serious injury; but the Legislature has seen 
fit to provide definite schedules for the compensation 
for such an injury. The insurance rates have been 
based upon such legislative enactment and if the Indus-
trial Cioiilll]ission is permitted to disregard the legis-
lative mandate, then all employees an~ employers will 
suffer by the uncertainty thus created. It is, therefore, 
respectfully submitted that the award of the Industrial 
Commission should be annulled. 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
.Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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